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Economic Perspective 
UK MEMBERSHIP OF THE EMS - TIME FOR ANOTHER LOOK? 
by Bill Stewart, Department of Economics 
The UK is a member of the EMS but does not particiate in its most important 
element, the exchange rate regime. The UK expressed a willingness to join 
when "conditions were appropriate" but so far has never found any set of 
conditions to be appropriate. 
Should the UK now join the EMS in the expectation of enjoying greater 
exchange rate stability against a group of countries which form its major 
trading partner by far - accounting for 43% of its visible trade in 1980. 
The independent pound sterling has shown greater variability than EMS 
currencies. It has been argued that as a member of EMS the pound would have 
avoided the excessive appreciation of 1980 and the subsequent depreciation 
of 1981-82, to the benefit particularly of UK manufacturing industry. 
The UK has argued for retaining independence from the EMS exchange rate 
regime on a number oi grounds. The pound sterling it is argued is a petro-
currency suDject to the vagaries of capital flows determined by changing 
expectations with regard to oil output and price from both her own and OPEC 
sources and requiring greater flexibility in exchange rate than would be 
available in the EMS. This argument would carry less weight if the UK was 
to enter the EMS with a margin of plus or minus 6? from the central rate, a 
provision currently enjoyed by Italy. 
Germany also has a currency which is expensively used internationally and 
has managed to operate satisfactorily within the narrower plus or minus 
2.25% margins. However, uncertainties regarding the equilibrium exchange 
rate between the dollar and the deutschemark introduce pressures into the 
EMS wnich would be heightened if the UK was also a member. The relatively 
relaxed approach of the UK authorities to the dollar appreciation in early 
August this year is in marked contrast to the heavy intervention undertaken 
by the Bundesbanks and other central banks. Such a relaxed approach would 
not have been possible in the EMS. 
Perhaps of more serious concern is the appropriate exchange rate at whicn 
the UK should enter the system. Most commentators agree that the £ is 
seriously over-valued in relation to many of its major competitors (see 
Table 1) and that to enter at an over-valued rate would place the UK at a 
serious competitive disadvantage for an expended period. There is, 
however, no agreement as to what an appropriate exchange rate would be and 
rapid agreement in the EMS is unlikely. 
Although the UK is increasingly dependent on EEC countries for trade, her 
trade with non-members is equally important, and it is argued that an 
effective exchange rate target allowing for the influence of non-EMS trading 
partners is mure appropriate in these circumstances. However, to the 
extent that UK trade with other EMS countries grows and other countries join 
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the EEC the UK case for retaining an independently flexible exchange rate is 
weakened. 
TABLE 1 PRICE DEFLATORS AMD EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FROM 
1978 TO 1982 IN RELATION TO 17 MAJOR PARTNERS 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherland 
UK 
Relative* 
Prices 
1 
89.7 
100.3 
84.2 
111.8 
119.7 
139.8 
91.5 
118.8 
Effective** 
Exchange 
Rate Indices 
2 
1982 in Relation to 
87.8 
81 .0 
107.2 
87.1 
86.9 
76.9 
104.2 
116.0 
Real 
Exchange 
Ratelndices 
3 = 1x2 
1978 
78.7 
81 .3 
90.3 
97 . «• 
104.5 
107.5 
95.3 
137.8 
* Individual countries GDP price deflators, measured against 17 major 
partners, export weighted, variable from year to year till 1977 
** 1982 Effective exchange rate using June 1982 central rate for 
for EMS countries. 
Source: European Economy June 1982 
Another argument employed is that the UK has made better progress towards 
meeting certain of the targets necessary for policy convergence - control 01 
the money supply, reduction in the level of inflation, reduction in the 
budget deficit - outside the EMS than many countries have inside it and that 
therefore the arguments for membership based on ensuring greater policy 
discipline are reduced. On the other hand the overall performance 01 the UK 
economy is still inferior to that of other members of the EMS and progress 
by the UK could be regarded as establishing conditions whicn would make the 
transition to EMS membership easier. In these circumstances does retention 
of freedom to adjust the exchange rate lose some or its appeal and might not 
the acceptance of an exchange rate target as a full member of the EMS not 
have an important psychological impact regarding the seriousness or the 
intent to pursue the appropriate economic policies necfosary to sustain EMS 
membership* 
Given the ultimately political nature of the EMS, the UK cannot indefinitely 
postpone membership of the EMS and remain in the EEC, particularly if 
further integrative advances are proposed in the system. As UK trade with 
the EEC expands, particularly as new members are admitted, the attractions 
of EMS membership will be enhanced. In the field of international monetary 
relations the UK may find a more persuasive outlet for her interests through 
the EEC and the EMS than by pursuing an independent approach in negotiations 
with the USA and Japan and other members of the IMF. 
The UK is being pushed towards EMS membership both by economic and political 
factors. The major question is when the economic factors would be regarded 
as sufficiently attractive to enhance the expected, if more tenuous, 
political benefits. 
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